

# Exam in Microeconomics for Phd.

## NYU Economics

**Lecturer:** Ariel Rubinstein

**Date:** October 21st, 2021

**Time:** 09:00 - 12:00

**Instructions:** You are asked to answer the three questions. It is an exam with "open-books" and you can use any written resources. Obviously you are forbidden from communicating with anybody during the exam.



**Question 1.** Let  $A$  be a set of at least three objects. A distance function  $d$  assigns a number in  $[0, 1]$  to every pair of objects such that for every  $x, y, z \in A$

$$d(x, x) = 0; d(x, y) = d(y, x); \text{ and } d(x, y) + d(y, z) \geq d(x, z).$$

Let  $N = \{1, \dots, n\}$  be a set of individuals. Each individual  $i$  holds a distance function on  $A$ .

An aggregator  $F$  assigns a distance function to every profile of distance functions  $(d_1, \dots, d_n)$ .

An aggregator is *simple* if there exists a function  $f$  which assigns a number in  $[0, 1]$  to every vector of distances  $(\alpha_1, \dots, \alpha_n)$  such that:

- (i)  $f$  generates  $F$  in the sense that  $F(d_1, \dots, d_n)(x, y) = f(d_1(x, y), \dots, d_n(x, y))$ .
- (ii) *Unanimity*:  $f(c, \dots, c) = c$  for all  $c \in [0, 1]$
- (iii) *Anonymity*:  $f(\alpha_1, \dots, \alpha_n) = f(\beta_1, \dots, \beta_n)$  if  $(\beta_1, \dots, \beta_n)$  is a permutation of  $(\alpha_1, \dots, \alpha_n)$ .

- (a) Assume that the distance between any two objects must be either 0 or 1. Find a simple aggregator.
- (b) Assume that the distance between two objects can be any number in  $[0, 1]$ . Find another example of a simple aggregator.
- (c) Show that there is only one correct answer to (a).

**Question 2.** Professors of economics evaluate job candidates. The set of candidates is large but eventually the choice will be made from a subset containing an odd number of candidates. Professors care only about the candidate's attitude towards behavioral economics, which is measured by a non-zero real number (for example, +3 is more positive than +1 and  $-50$  is negative). Let  $X = \text{Reals} \setminus \{0\}$ . Assume that no two candidates have the same attitude. Thus, each professor can be described as a choice function that selects one number from each odd cardinality set of numbers.

Both professors wish to select a candidate who best reflects the mood of the profession. Both believe that the attitude to behavioral economics is distributed according to a Normal distribution: either  $N(+2, 1)$  or  $N(-2, 1)$ .

When facing a set of candidates  $Y$ :

Professor A finds the distribution that best explains  $Y$  in the sense of maximum likelihood (that is,  $N(+2, 1)$  if  $\sum_{x \in Y} x > 0$ , and  $N(-2, 1)$  if  $\sum_{x \in Y} x < 0$ ) and then chooses the candidate in  $Y$  who is the closest to the peak of that distribution.

Professor B divides  $Y$  into two groups: positive candidates (closer to +2) and negative candidates (closer to  $-2$ ). He chooses the candidate in  $Y$  with a positive attitude who is closest to +2 if the majority of candidates are positive, and the candidate with a negative attitude who is closest to  $-2$  if the majority are negative.

- (0) Formalize the two professors as choice functions  $c_A$  and  $c_B$ .
- (1) Is either professor rationalizable as a maximizer of a preference relation on  $X$  (the set of possible attitudes toward b.e.)? Prove your answer.
- (2) Show that the following property of choice functions is satisfied by the two professors: For any  $X \supseteq Y_1 \supset Y_2 \supset Y_3$ , if  $a = c(Y_1) \neq c(Y_2) = b$  and  $a, b \in Y_3$ , then  $c(Y_3) \in \{a, b\}$ .
- (3) Show that the following property distinguishes between the two professors: If  $c(Y) = c(Z) = a$  and  $Y \cap Z = \{a\}$ , then  $c(Y \cup Z) = a$  (that is, the property is satisfied by one professor but not the other).

**Question 3.** A *test* is a finite vector of 0's and 1's. Let  $X$  be the set of tests. The interpretation of the test  $(1, 0, 1, 1)$  (for example) is that a student will be asked to answer one of four questions; he fails the test if asked the second and passes if he asked one of the other three. Define  $n(s)$  to be the number of possible questions in test  $s$  (i.e. the length of the vector  $s$ ).

A compound test  $s \oplus t$  (where  $s, t \in X$ ) is a test in which the student will be given one of the two tests  $s$  or  $t$ . The student identifies the compound test as a test (vector) of length  $n(s_1) + n(s_2)$  where the vector  $s$  is first and the second is  $t$ . Thus, for example, if  $s = (1, 1, 1)$  and  $t = (1, 0)$  then  $s \oplus t = (1, 1, 1, 1, 0)$ .

Let  $\succsim$  be a preference relation over  $X$  satisfying the following properties:

*Symmetry:* if  $s$  is a permutation of  $t$  then  $s \sim t$ .

*Monotonicity:* any sequence of ones is better than any sequence of zeroes.

*Independence (I):* if  $s \succsim t$  if and only if  $s \oplus r \succsim t \oplus r$  for every tests  $r, s, t$ .

- (a) Interpret I. Explain why  $\succsim$  cannot be the preference relation with the utility representation  $u(s) =$ “the proportion of ones in  $s$ ”.
- (b) Given one example of the many preference relations that satisfy the three properties.
- (c) Show that it is impossible that both  $(0, 0) \sim (0)$  and  $(1, 1) \sim (1)$ .
- (d) Show that there is only one preference relation satisfying the three assumptions and  $(1, 1) \sim (1)$ .

**Question 1 – Solution:**

(a) Define the aggregator  $F$  by  $F[d_1, \dots, d_N](x, y) = \max\{d_i(x, y)\}$ .

$F$  is a distance function since:

- (1)  $\max\{d_i(x, x)\} = 0$  for all  $x \in A$ ;
- (2)  $\max\{d_i(x, y)\} = \max\{d_i(y, x)\}$  for all  $x, y \in A$ ; and
- (3) if  $d_i(x, z) = \max\{d_i(x, z)\}$  then for any  $x, y, z \in A$ :

$$F[d_1, \dots, d_n](x, z) = d_i(x, z) \leq d_i(x, y) + d_i(y, z) \leq F[d_1, \dots, d_n](x, y) + F[d_1, \dots, d_n](y, z)$$

Obviously,  $F$  is generated by  $f(\alpha_1, \dots, \alpha_N) = \max\{\alpha_i\}$  which satisfies Unanimity and Anonymity.

(b) Let  $F[d_1, d_2, \dots, d_n](x, y) = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^n d_i(x, y)$ .

For every profile of distance functions  $(d_1, \dots, d_n)$ ,  $F[d_1, d_2, \dots, d_n]$  is the distance function since:

- (1)  $d_i(x, x) = 0$  for all  $x \in A$  and distance functions  $d_i$ ;
- (2)  $d_i(x, y) = d_i(y, x)$  for all  $x, y \in A$  and distance functions  $d_i$ ; and
- (3) for all  $x, y, z \in A$ ,

$$\frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^n d_i(x, z) \leq \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^n (d_i(x, y) + d_i(y, z)) = F[d_1, \dots, d_n](x, y) + F[d_1, \dots, d_n](y, z)$$

The aggregator  $F$  is generated by  $f(\alpha_1, \dots, \alpha_n) = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^n \alpha_i$  which satisfies Unanimity and Anonymity.

(c) Let  $F$  be a simple aggregator generated by  $f$ . Let  $k^*$  be the maximal  $k$  for which there is a vector  $(\alpha_1, \dots, \alpha_n)$  with  $k$  ones, such that  $f(\alpha_1, \dots, \alpha_n) = 0$ . Assume by contradiction that  $k^* > 0$ . Since  $f$  satisfies Unanimity,  $k^* < n$ .

Let  $a, b, c$  be three elements in  $A$ .

Consider the profile of distance functions described by the following table:

agent $i$	$d_i(a, b)$	$d_i(b, c)$	$d_i(a, c)$	other $d_i(x, y)$ ( $x \neq y$ )
1	0	1	1	1
2	1	0	1	1
3	1	1	1	1
$\vdots$	1	1	1	1
$k^* + 1$	1	1	1	1
$k^* + 2$	0	0	0	1
$\vdots$	0	0	0	1
$n$	0	0	0	1

By the definition of  $k^*$ , the distance function  $F(d_{.1}, \dots, d_{.n})$  must assign 0 to  $(a, b)$  and to  $(b, c)$  and 1 to  $(a, c)$ , contradicting the triangle inequality.

**Question 2 – Solution:**

(0) Professor A, when facing the set  $Y$ , calculates the difference between the loglikelihoods of  $Y$  given  $N(2, 1)$  and  $N(-2, 1)$ , which is given by:

$$\sum_{x \in Y} \frac{(x-2)^2}{2} - \sum_{x \in Y} \frac{(x+2)^2}{2} = 2 \sum_{x \in Y} x. \text{ Thus,}$$

$$C_A(Y) = \begin{cases} \operatorname{argmin}_{x \in Y} |x - 2| & \sum_{x \in S} x > 0 \\ \operatorname{argmin}_{x \in Y} |x + 2| & \sum_{x \in S} x < 0 \end{cases}$$

Professor B's choice depends on whether the majority of candidates are positive or negative. In the former case, he chooses the positive candidate closest to 2; in the latter case, he chooses the negative candidate closest to  $-2$ :

$$C_B(Y) = \begin{cases} \operatorname{argmin}_{x \in Y \cap \mathbb{R}_+} |x - 2| & |\{x \in Y | x > 0\}| > |\{x \in Y | x < 0\}| \\ \operatorname{argmin}_{x \in Y \cap \mathbb{R}_-} |x + 2| & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

(1) Neither professor satisfies condition  $\alpha$  and therefore neither is rationalizable. For example, let  $Y = \{-2, 1, 2\}$  and  $Z = \{-3, -2, -1, 1, 2\}$ . Then,  $C_A(Z) = C_B(Z) = -2$ , while  $C_A(Y) = C_B(Y) = 2$  although  $-2 \in Y$ , violating  $\alpha$  for each of the choice functions.

(2) Assume  $Y_1 \supset Y_2 \supset Y_3$ ,  $a = c(Y_1) \neq c(Y_2) = b$  and  $a, b \in Y_3$ .

Professor A: Since  $a$  and  $b$  are in all three sets, it must be that one of them is closer to  $+2$  than the other members of  $Y_3$  and the other is closest to  $-2$  out of all the members of  $Y_3$ ; thus, one of them is  $C_A(Y_3)$ .

Professor B: It must be that  $a$  and  $b$  do not have the same sign, i.e. one is positive and the other negative. One of them will be the closest to  $+2$  among the positive members of  $Y_3$  and the other will be the closest to  $-2$  among the negative members of  $Y_3$  and therefore  $C_B(Y_3) \in \{a, b\}$ .

(3) Professor A doesn't satisfy this property. Let  $Y = \{4, -1, -2\}$  and  $Z = \{4, -3, -0.5\}$ . Then,  $C_A(Y) = C_A(Z) = 4$ , but  $C_A(Y \cup \{-3, -0.5\}) = -2$ .

Professor B does satisfies this property: Assume  $Y \cap Z = \{a\}$  and  $C_B(Y) = C_B(Z) = a$ . WLOG,  $a > 0$ . Then,  $a$  is closest to  $+2$  in both  $Y$  and  $Z$ . Furthermore, a majority of members in both  $Y$  and  $Z$  are positive. Thus, a majority of elements in  $Y \cup Z$  are also positive, and  $a$  is the closest member to  $+2$  in  $Y \cup Z$ ; that is,  $C_B(Y \cup Z) = a$ .



**Question 3 – Solution :**

a) (I) means that an agent compares two compound tests with some common questions by comparing the questions that differ between them – i.e. they ‘cancel’ out questions that are present in both before making a comparison.

Consider the preferences represented by  $u$ . Let  $s = (1, 0)$ ,  $t = (1, 1, 0, 0)$  and  $r = (1)$ .  $u(s) = u(t)$  but  $u(s \oplus r) > u(t \oplus r)$ . b) Ranking tests by the number of 1’s (the more the better).

c) Suppose  $(1, 1) \sim (1) \succ (0, 0) \sim (0)$ . Then, by I,  $(1, 0) \sim (1, 1, 0)$ ,  $(1, 0, 0) \sim (1, 0)$ , and  $(1, 1, 0) \succ (0, 1, 0) \sim (1, 0, 0)$ , and therefore  $(1, 0) \sim (1, 1, 0) \succ (1, 0, 0) \sim (1, 0)$ , a contradiction.

d) Suppose  $(1) \sim (1, 1)$ . Then, by I  $(1, 0) \sim (1, 1, 0)$ . Since  $(1) \succ (0)$ , then by I we also have  $(1, 0, 1) \succ (1, 0, 0)$ . Together, we have  $(1, 0) \sim (1, 1, 0) \sim (1, 0, 1) \succ (1, 0, 0)$  and therefore by I  $(0) \succ (0, 0)$ .

Applying I, any sequence of  $k$  ones is better than a sequence of  $l$  zeros if  $k < l$  and is indifferent between all sequences of constant 1.

Let  $m[0] \oplus n[1]$  be the sequence of  $m$  zeros and  $n$  ones. By symmetry for every  $x \in X$  there are integers  $x_0, x_1$  such that  $x \sim x_0[0] \oplus x_1[1]$ .

Applying I multiple times we get:

$$x \sim x_0[0] \oplus x_1[1] \sim x_0[0] \oplus 1[1] \succsim y_0[0] \oplus 1[1] \sim y_0[0] \oplus y_1[1] \sim y$$

iff  $x_0 \leq y_0$ .

This result implies that if he is indifferent between tests that he will pass for sure, then he prefers a test with the least number of possibilities.